Home | deutsch  | Legals | Sitemap | KIT

Auction and Mechanism Design

Auction and Mechanism Design
Type: Vorlesung (V)
Semester: SS 2017
Time: 2017-04-27
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau


2017-05-04
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-05-11
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-05-18
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-06-01
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-06-08
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-06-22
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-06-29
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-07-06
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-07-13
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-07-20
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau

2017-07-27
15:45 - 17:15 wöchentlich
30.41 Chemie-Hörsaal Nr. 3 (HS3) 30.41 Chemie-Flachbau


Lecturer: Prof. Dr. Nora Szech
SWS: 2
Lv-No.: 2560550
Prerequisites

None.

Recommendations:

Basic knowledge of microeconomics and statistics are recommended. A background in game theory is helpful, but not absolutely necessary.

Bibliography

Krishna, V.: Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2009.

Milgrom, P.: Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Mathews, S.: A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values No. 1096. Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1995.

Content of teaching

The course starts with the basic theory of equilibrium behavior and revenue management in one object standard auctions. The revenue equivalence theorem for standard auctions is introduced. Thereafter, the course focuses on mechanism design and its applications to one object auctions and bilateral trade.

Annotation

The lecture will be held in English.

Workload

The total workload for this course is approximately 135.0 hours. For further information see German version.

Aim

The students

  • can analyze strategic behavior in auctions;
  • can compare auction formats with regard to efficiency and revenue;
  • are familiar with the basic theory of (Bayesian) mechanism design;
  • master the revenue equivalence theorem for standard auctions;
  • can apply mechanism design to one object auctions and bilateral trade.
Exam description

The assessment consists of a written exam (60 minutes) (following §4(2), 1 of the examination regulation).
The exam takes place in every semester. Re-examinations are offered at every ordinary examination date.

Students can earn a bonus to the final grade by successfully participating in the exercises.