I propose an auction model which reflects a situation in which one bidder faces competitors who are much better informed about the prize's quality. Situations like this might occur in market entry situations like the recent 5G spectrum auction in Germany, where after intense bidding, a new market entrant managed to obtain a significant share of the spectrum. I extend the standard independent private value model to capture this type of information asymmetry and retrieve unique equilibrium predictions in undominated strategies. In a sealed bid format, the uninformed bidder is at a clear disadvantage and can predominantly only succeed in the auction if the object's quality is low. An open auction format can completely level the playing field, implementing the first best efficient outcome.
Setting Adequate Wages for Workers: Managers’ work experience, incentive scheme and gender matter (PLoS One, Publication)
Many societies report an increasingly divergent development of managers’ salaries compared to that of their workforce. Moreover, there is often a lack in diversity amongst managerial boards. We investigate the role of managers’ gender and incentive scheme on wages chosen for workers by conducting two experimental studies. The data reveal male managers respond in more self-oriented ways to their incentive scheme. Further, we find that experience with the workers’ task can increase appreciation of workers. Effects are strongest when the managers’ compensation scheme rules out self-orientation. Overall, female managers display more consistency in choosing adequate wages for workers, i.e. their choices are less affected by incentives. An increase in diversity may thus help reducing salary disparities and foster work atmosphere.
- since 2017: PhD student and research assistant at the Chair of Political Economy (ECON)
- 2015-2017: Master of Science in Applied Economics at the University of Innsbruck
- 2008-2014: Bachelor of Science in Technical Mathematics at the University of Innsbruck