None.

Recommendations:

Basic knowledge of microeconomics and statistics are recommended. A background in game theory is helpful, but not absolutely necessary.

Krishna, V.: Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2009.

Milgrom, P.: Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Mathews, S.: A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values No. 1096. Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1995.

The course starts with the basic theory of equilibrium behavior and revenue management in one object standard auctions. The revenue equivalence theorem for standard auctions is introduced. Thereafter, the course focuses on mechanism design and its applications to one object auctions and bilateral trade.

The lecture will be held in English.

The total workload for this course is approximately 135.0 hours. For further information see German version.

The students

• can analyze strategic behavior in auctions;

• can compare auction formats with regard to efficiency and revenue;
• are familiar with the basic theory of (Bayesian) mechanism design;
• master the revenue equivalence theorem for standard auctions;
• can apply mechanism design to one object auctions and bilateral trade.

The assessment consists of a written exam (60 minutes) (following §4(2), 1 of the examination regulation).
The exam takes place in every semester. Re-examinations are offered at every ordinary examination date.

Students can earn a bonus to the final grade by successfully participating in the exercises.